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BARTH ON EVIL 
Nicholas Wolterstorff 
In this paper I offer an interpretation of Karl Barth's discussion of evil in vol-
ume III/3 of his Church Dogmatics. It is, I contend, an extraordinarily rich, 
imaginative and provocative discussion, philosophically informed, yet very 
different from the mainline philosophical treatments of the topic-and from 
the mainline theological treatments as well. I argue that though Barth's 
account is certainly subject to critique at various points, especially on onto-
logical matters, nonetheless philosophers are well advised to take seriously 
what he says. It offers a powerful attack on many standard lines of thought. 
§1. Though Karl Barth has much to say about evil, he does not aim to 
explain evil. Explanation, he says, is impossible; evil is "necessarily 
incomprehensible and inexplicable to us as human beings" (311). 
Working as a Christian theologian whose thought is firmly grounded in 
the scriptures, he develops instead a theological framework for thinking 
and speaking about evil. The development, extraordinarily rich, and as 
difficult and expansive as rich, occurs in the third part of the third vol-
ume of his Church Dogmatics, this being the volume in which he devel-
ops the doctrine of creation. 
Having devoted §49 of III/3 to a discussion of providence, under its 
three aspects of preservation, accompaniment, and rule, he then opens 
the following section thus: 
There is opposition and resistance to God's world-dominion. 
There is in world-occurrence an element, indeed an entire sinis-
ter system of elements, which is not comprehended by God's 
providence in the sense thus far described, and which is not 
therefore preserved, accompanied, nor ruled by the almighty 
action of God like creaturely occurrence .... There is amongst the 
objects of God's providence an alien factor. It cannot escape 
God's providence but is comprehended by it. The manner, how-
ever, in which this is done is highly peculiar in accordance with 
the particular nature of this factor. ... The result is that the alien 
factor can never be considered or mentioned together in the 
same context as other objects of God's providence. Thus the 
whole doctrine of God's providence must be investigated afresh. 
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This opposition and resistance, this stubborn element and alien 
factor, may be provisionally defined as nothingness [das 
Nichtigel (289). 
Evil is nothingness. "Evil" is not defined as nothingness by Barth. Rather, 
evil is identified by Barth as nothingness. To the question, "What really is 
evil?" the answer he gives is, "Nothingness." Nothingness is what our 
word "evil" designates. Scriptural words for nothingness-thus, for 
evil-are "chaos" and "the demonic." The fundamental feature of noth-
ingness is that it menaces-menaces God and creature alike, especially 
those creatures which are human. Evil is the actualization of this menace . 
... the being of the creature is menaced by nothingness, menaced 
in such a way that it needs the divine preservation and sustain-
ing and indeed deliverance if it is not to fall victim to it and per-
ish. Obviously it is menaced by something far more serious 
than mere non-being as opposed to being, although it is of 
course menaced by non-being too .... that is chaos according to 
the biblical term and concept (75-76). 
The word Barth actually uses to designate that which is evil is, of 
course, not "nothingness," since he was writing in German; it's "das 
Nichtige." The translators recognize that "nothingness" is inadequate as 
a translation of "das Nichtige." Though accurate, its connotations are 
much too pallid. Since translation is not my concern here, I will, when 
speaking in my own voice, avoid the issue and regularly use Barth's 
original, "das Nichtige"; when quoting from the English translation of 
Barth's text I will, however, quote the translation as it stands. 
Before we can get in hand the various things Barth says about das 
Nichtige, we need some glimmer of what he has in mind. One point of 
access to his thought here is his discussion of Heidegger and Sartre; for 
though Barth regards their comprehension of das Nichtige as shallow 
compared to that available to the Christian, he thinks that they did 
nonetheless recognize das Nichtige. They recognized that das Nichtige is 
"no mere fiction or theme of discussion. It is no mere product of our 
negations to be dismissed by our affirmations. It is there. It assails us 
with irresistible power as we exist, and we exist as we are propelled by 
it into the world like a projectile. We are forced to consider it, for it 
already confronts us. We experience nothingness .... Their [i.e., 
Heidegger's and Sartre'sl thought is determined in and by real 
encounter with nothingness. They may misinterpret this encounter and 
therefore nothingness, but not for a moment can they forget it" (345). 
What brought das Nichtige with inescapable force to the attention of 
Heidegger and Sartre was the calamitous times through which they 
lived. Both lived through the "upheaval occasioned by two world wars. 
They have completely abandoned the optimism and pessimism ... of the 
18th and 19th centuries ..... For the moment at least they cannot deny that 
nothingness-and it may well be the true nothingness-has ineluctably 
and unforgettably confronted them .... Whoever is ignorant of the shock 
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experienced and attested by Heidegger and Sartre is surely incapable of 
thinking and speaking as a modern man .... For we men of to-day have 
consciously or unconsciously sustained this shock. In our time man has 
encountered nothingness in such a way as to be offered an exceptional 
opportunity in this respect. More than that may and must not be said, 
for at all times man has his being within this encounter, and no more 
than an exceptional opportunity of realising this is offered us even to-
day. Even to-day we have no reason to boast that 'we have looked in 
the face of demons'" (345). We have indeed. But all men and all women 
at all times and in all places have done so-whether or not they knew 
that they were doing so. 
Heidegger and Sartre were witnesses to the menacing power of das 
Nichtige. To the presence of the demonic among us. To that strange fac-
tor in reality which powerfully menaces not only our flourishing but our 
existence. To that which threatens our existence and our shalom with 
nihilation. More than merely human sin and its consequences, more 
than merely that plus the evils which befall us, das Nichtige is that 
power, that dynamic, that menacing and destructive factor (Barth's 
words) of which these are the concrete manifestations. Das Nichtige is 
the power of darkness that haunts our world. Menace. Cosmic menace. 
Barth's entire discussion pivots on his claim that evil is a power. 
Heidegger and Sartre sensed the presence of such a power. Holy 
Scripture affirms it-affirms that there is a power of darkness which 
haunts reality and is ever on the attack against creation in general and 
human beings in particular, affirms that human beings are helpless 
against it but that God, embracing the life and flourishing of his human 
creatures as his own, sacrificed his own Son as victim in the battle, there-
by winning the contest. "Holy Scripture regards nothingness as a king-
dom, based upon a claim to power and a seizure of power, ... always on 
the march, always invading and attacking. Its decisive insight is that 
God Himself is the superior and victorious Opponent of nothingness" 
(523-4). It "is for the Bible no mere figure of speech or poetic fancy or 
expression of human concern but the simple truth that nothingness has 
this dynamic, that it is a kingdom on the march and engaged in invasion 
and assault" (524). To deny such a power, says Barth, is to trivialize 
what transpired at the cross and in the resurrection. 
We must not deceive ourselves and say that it does not really do 
all these things, or is not real in all these things. One form of the 
triumph which nothingness can achieve is to represent itself as a 
mere appearance with no genuine reality. Let us only be proud 
and enlightened and unafraid and unconcerned in face of it! Let 
us only persuade ourselves that there is nothing in it, that there 
is no devil and no kingdom of evil and demons as his plenipo-
tentiaries, as effective powers and forces in the life of nations 
and societies, in the psychical and physical life of men and their 
relationships, that we can control our being without having to 
take into account this alien lordship or considering that where it 
is not broken all being and enterprise and achievement on earth 
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is fundamentally corrupt and worthless!... Nothingness rejoices 
when it notices that it is not noticed, that it is boldly demytholo-
gised, that humanity thinks it can tackle its lesser and greater 
problems with a little morality and medicine and psychology 
and aesthetics, with progressive politics or occasionally a philos-
ophy of unprecedented novelty-if only its own reality as noth-
ingness remains beautifully undisclosed and intact (526).' 
§2. Barth faces the topic of das Nichtige head-on immediately after he 
has discussed God's providential preservation, accompaniment, and 
rule of his creatures. But as he himself observes, reference to das Nichtige 
was already made in his discussion of God's preservation. So let's begin 
there. 
Before God created-if we may speak of "before" -before God creat-
ed, there was God and God alone. Nothing else, not anything else. The 
primeval-if we may speak of "primeval"-state of ,things, other than 
God, was that they just were not. That is, there were no other things than 
God. If things other than God are to exist they must be brought forth 
from not being. The only one who can do that is God-by creating. 
Creation is bringing things forth from the abyss of non-being. 
But we don't yet have das Nichtige in view. For Das Nichtige is not 
non-being as such. Non-being is, precisely, not anything; whereas das 
Nichtige is something: there is das Nichtige. Yet it's not the case that 
before God creates there is God and something else-namely, das Nichtige. 
Before God creates there is God and not anything else. Neither is it the 
case that das Nichtige is a creature brought forth from non-being by God. 
Das Nichtige is not a creature of God but comes about as the inevitable 
accompaniment of God's bringing forth of creatures. 
On God there are no limitations. In particular, on God's existence 
there are no limitations. God exists eternally, necessarily, and self-suffi-
ciently. By contrast, the existence of the creature is inherently limited. 
To no creature does it belong to be endless, omnipresent or 
enduring. The preservation which God grants to the creature is 
the preservation of its limited being ... .It will be understood that 
it is not for this reason partial, transitory or imperfect. Indeed, 
for this very reason it is a complete and final and perfect preser-
vation. For what could be more perfect than that God should 
give to the creature ... that which is proper to it, that to each one 
He should give that which is proper, that is, that which it is able 
to have of being, and of space and time for that being, according 
to its existence as posited by the wisdom and power of God, and 
that which it ought to have of being and space and time accord-
ing to the righteousness and mercy of God (61-62)? 
Why the repeated reference to God's activity of preserving? Because 
among the intrinsic limitations of the creature is its lack of self-sufficien-
cy. God cannot give to the creature self-sufficient existence. 
Accordingly, the creature forever bears within itself the possibility of 
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sliding back-better, the tendency to slide back-into the abyss of non-
being. It's as if non-being is tugging, pulling, at the creature-as if it has 
an attracting power over it. Only God's preserving activity prevents the 
creature's tendency toward not being from being realized. Indeed, 
God's preserving activity just is God's prevention of the realization of 
that tendency.2 Non-being is "the abyss in which [the creature] must 
inevitably sink, the ocean by whose waves it must inevitably be over-
whelmed, if He who created it did not also preserve and sustain it" (77). 
The reason, once again, is that the creature "is not God. It is the reality 
which is distinct from God, elected, willed and actualised by Him, but 
differentiated from Him, and therefore not participating in His sover-
eignty or in the freedom of his election and decision. And as such, if 
God did not will to save and keep it, it might well, indeed it must, be 
overwhelmed by chaos and fall into nothingness" (74). To be a creature 
is to be subject to the menacing tug of nihilation (annihilation) which 
only God's providential preservation can avert. The "being of the crea-
ture is menaced by nothingness, menaced in such a way that it needs the 
divine preservation and sustaining and indeed deliverance if it is not to 
fall victim to it and perish"(75-76). 
Vas Nichtige is that menacing power. Given the non-self-sufficiency 
of creatures, a creature cannot exist without being subject to the menac-
ing tendency to sink out of existence. Vas Nichtige is that menacing ten-
dency, inherent in being a creature which is not self-sufficient, toward 
not being: "the tremendous danger, the most serious peril," so complete-
ly hostile" to the creature as to be "an absolute denial of the essence and 
existence of the creature" (76). Das Nichfige comprises more than the 
tendency of every creature to sink into non-existence; shortly we shall 
see what the more is. But this, at least, it is. 
The shadow which flees before God, possesses everywhere in 
the Bible its own ponderable reality. God knows this nothing as 
the opponent of the creature, as that which may and can seduce 
and destroy the creature. God knows that under the dominion 
of this nothing the creature must perish. It is always present-
as it were on the frontier of the cosmos to which He has given 
being. It continually calls this cosmos in question. It has mount-
ed an offensive against it. If only for a moment God were to 
turn away His face from the creature, the offensive would break 
loose with deadly power. In its relation to God chaos is always 
an absolutely subordinate factor, but it is always absolutely 
superior in its relation to the creature (76). 
Now look at creation from a slightly different angle. "When in cre-
ation God pronounced His wise and omnipotent Yes He also pro-
nounced His wise and omnipotent No .... He marked off the positive real-
ity of the creature from that which He did not elect and will and there-
fore did not create. And to that which He denied He allotted the being 
of non-being, the existence of that which does not exist" (77). "[T]hat 
which He did not elect and will, the non-existent, comprises the infinite 
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range of all the possibilities which He passed over and with good reason 
did not actualise, the abyss in which the one thing which He did create 
must inevitably sink...if he who created it did not also preserve and sus-
tain it" (77). The thought is that originally there was God and non-being 
-that is, God and nothing else; now, after creation, there is God, crea-
tures, and all that God did not create. Barth calls this last, "that which is 
not." God's activity of creating perforce brings about this new 'realm' of 
that which is not. 
What are we to make of this? Barth's words invite the following 
interpretation: God's creation has a bright side and a shadow side. The 
bright side consists of all the things God brought about by saying Yes to 
them; these are the creatures. The shadow side consists of all the things 
God brought about by saying No to them; these are the unactualized 
possibles. It is these unactualized possibles, that which is not, which 
menace the creature and thus constitute das Nichtige. Barth says that that 
which is not "is truly actual and relevant and even active after its own 
particular fashion" (74). He says that "In the power-that is, the nega-
tive power-of this divine creating, approving, dividing and calling, 
there enters in with the creature that which in all these things is marked 
off from it, and it enters in with menacing power, the power of the 
denial of that which God has affirmed, as the non-being which does not 
exist, as that which is not created, as that which is so absolutely opposed 
and hostile to the creature" (77). He identifies that IDhich is not as "that 
which according to the account in Genesis 1:2 [God] set behind him as 
chaos" (74). And he describes it as the object of God's "wrath and rejec-
tion and judgment" (77). The picture comes to mind of a numberless 
swarm of possible wrens, robins, sparrows, and such like, to which God 
in wrath said "No, I refuse to create you," and which now menace crea-
tures by trying to drag them down into the abyss where they too will 
become mere possibles. 
If this is how Barth was thinking, it won't do. That there are unactu-
alized possibles is a position which enjoys philosophical respectability-
though I myself regard it as mistaken. But even if one holds that there 
are mere possibles, I don't see that it's tenable to suppose that creation 
consists of bringing about existent things, on the one hand, and non-
existent possibles, on the other. One can see what was going through 
Barth's mind: there's an infinitude of possibilities that God rejected at 
creation; God's options were not limited to what God actually created. 
But the question to ask is how God's rejection of these possibles could 
bring them about? Don't they have to be there already if God is to reject 
them? And aren't the actuals also possibles; viz., actualized possibles? If 
one holds that there are possibles, then much better to think of God as 
selecting some from among the already-extant possibles to actualize, and 
choosing to let the others remain unactualized. But then, of course, 
before creation it's not God and non-being, that is, God and nothing else; 
it's God and an infinite realm of possibles. An unacceptable option. 
Beyond a doubt Barth wanted to avoid it. He saw no option but to say 
that in creating, God brought about the rejected possibles. 
But rather than postulating possibles, some actualized, some not, bet-
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ter to recover the Augustinian way of thinking: Before creation there 
was indeed just God and nothing else. But as part of that reality which is 
God there are the divine ideas, some of these being ideas of individual 
things. In creating, God chose to exemplify some of his exemplifiable 
individual ideas and not others. Barth remarks that JJthat which is not is 
that which is actual only in the negativity allotted to it by the divine 
decision, only in its exclusion from creation, only, if we may put it thus, 
at the left hand of God" (73-74). What this comes to, on the Augustinian 
interpretation, is that only after God decided to exemplify certain of his 
ideas and not others, will the latter have the property of not having been 
chosen by God for exemplification in creation. But then, they really do 
have that property. That which is not" has and can have its actuality 
only under the almighty No of God, but does have and is actuality in 
that sense" (74). 
There's more that needs correcting than the ontology, however; what 
Barth says about the unactualized possibles is even more questionable 
than his postulation thereof. Surely un actualized possibles, supposing 
there are such, are totally lacking in activity and power. They menace no 
one. And why should they be the objects of God's wrath? Presumably 
God liked them less, individually and in combination, than the possibles 
God actualized; otherwise God would not have said No to them. But 
does the No have to be a wrathful No? Why should all those impotent, 
non-menacing, merely-possible wrens, robins, and sparrows be the 
object of God's wrath? 
Is it possible to spy what Barth might have been trying to get at? In 
particular, is it possible to spy something that he might have been trying 
to get at which is consistent with what we earlier interpreted him as say-
ing? Or do we have to say, with regret, that this part of his thought is all 
confusion? Well, consider what he says at the very beginning of his dis-
cussion of that which is not: 
God created [the creature] "out of nothing," that is, by distin-
guishing that which He willed from that which He did not will, 
and by giving it existence on the basis of that distinction. To 
that divine distinction it owes the fact that it is. And to the same 
distinction it owes the fact that it can continue to be. By preserv-
ing the distinction God preserves the creature (73). 
I suggest that what Barth wants to call to our attention is an additional 
aspect of the menacing tendency which confronts the creature. So far we 
have described that menace as the tendency toward not existing. But 
once we see that creation consists of God distinguishing among possibil-
ities in deciding to exemplify some of his exemplifiable archetypes and 
not others, then we see that the menacing tendency which confronts the 
creature is also the tendency toward the overthrowing of the distinction 
God made in creating-that between those of his ideas which he exem-
plified and those which he did not. Earlier in our discussion, God's 
providential preservation was described as the preservation of the crea-
ture in existence, against the ever-present threat thereto; now we see that 
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it can also be described as the preservation of the distinction among pos-
sibilities, made in creation, against the ever-present threat to that.3 
Before we move on, we must look at creation from yet another angle. 
The creature is created and preserved in order that it may live in fellow-
ship with God, "in order that the glory of the beloved Son of God may 
be manifest in it" (79), in order that it may "participate in [the]work of 
salvation" (79). For this fellowship, for this manifestation, for this par-
ticipation, it must exist. "It must have permanence and continuity. It 
must be preserved by God" (79). Thus the tendency of the creature 
toward not existing, which haunts the created order, menaces not only 
the creature, and not only that plus the differentiation God drew in cre-
ating, but also God's gracious intentions. 
[The menace] does not consist in the first instance in the power-
lessness of the creature in face of the non-existent. It cannot 
then be described or understood in the first instance only as a 
weakness, privation, or imperfection of the creature. It has its 
root in the foreordination of the creature to participation in the 
divine covenant of grace. Because it has to be present in the 
divine work of deliverance and liberation, it can therefore be 
present-present as a creature-in all the immeasurable perils in 
which it cannot preserve or sustain itself (80). 
§3. We do not yet have evil in view. We have discerned das Nichtige. 
It's that menacing tendency which faces the creature, by virtue of the 
creature's ontological non-self-sufficiency, to sink out of existence, and 
it's that menacing tendency which faces God, also by virtue of the crea-
ture's non-self-sufficiency, toward the overthrowing of the demarcations 
made by God at creation for the sake of fellowship with the creature. 
God's providential preservation staves off that menace, however. 
"Nothingness [has thus far] met us as this total peril which is not actual 
in this form but is warded off by God's preservation." So far then, no 
evil. Menace. But the menace is warded off. We have not yet seen das 
Nichtige in its persona of evil. 
Das Nichtige not only menaces the creature; it actually makes an incur-
sion into the life of the creature. Evil is the incursion of das Nichtigc into 
creation. The pages we have been looking at occur early in §49 of Church 
Dogmatics I1I/3, the topic of the section being "God the Father as Lord of 
His Creature." The topic of section §50 is "God and Nothingness" ("Gott 
und das Nichtige"). Here Barth discusses das Nichtige in the persona of 
evil. Conversely: here he develops his account of evil as das Nichtige. 
He sets himself some crucial theological parameters. When we con-
front evil, we confront the fact that "between the Creator and the crea-
ture .. .there is that at work which can be explained neither from the side of 
the Creator nor from that of the creature, neither as the action of the 
Creator nor as the life-act of the creature, and yet which cannot be over-
looked or disowned but must be reckoned with in all its peculiarity. The 
simple recognition that God is Lord over all must obviously be applied to 
this third factor as well. Where would be the real situation of the real man 
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or the real way of real trust of the real Christian, .. .if the knowledge that 
He is Lord over all were not applied especially to this element" (292)? 
Given this requirement, the challenge, for our explanation of God's 
lordship over evil, will be to avoid two opposite errors. "We stray on 
the one side if we argue that this element of das Nichtige derives from the 
positive will and work of God as if it too were a creature, and that the 
Creator Himself and His lordship are responsible for its nothingness, the 
creature being exonerated from all responsibility for its existence, pres-
ence and activity. But we go astray on the other side if we maintain that 
it derives solely from the activity of the creature, in relation to which the 
lordship of God can only be a passive permission and observation, an 
ineffectual foreknowledge and a subsequent attitude. How can justice 
be done both to the holiness and to the omnipotence of God when we 
are faced by the problem of nothingness" (292)? 
Barth begins his treatment by polemicizing against confusions of two 
sorts.4 The first, is that which identifies one and another form of nega-
tion inherent in creatures and their interrelationships, or inherent in 
God's relationships with creatures, with das Nichtige as such-or with 
das Nichtige qua evil. The fact that the creature is this and not that, and 
that God is this and not that, is not evil; neither is it das Nichtige in its 
persona of ontological menace. " ... nothingness is not simply to be 
equated with what is not, i.e., not God and not the creature." For one 
thing, "God is God and not the creature, but this does not mean that 
there is nothingness in God. On the contrary, this 'not' belongs to His 
perfection." And as to the creature, "the creature is creature and not 
God, yet this does not mean that as such it is null or nothingness. If in 
the relationship between God and creature a 'not' is involved, the 'not' 
belongs to the perfection of the relationship, and even the second 'not' 
which characterises the creature belongs to its perfection. Hence it 
would be blasphemy against God and His work if nothingness were to 
be sought in this 'not,' in the non-divinity of the creature." Then too, 
"the diversities and frontiers of the creaturely world contain many 
'nots.' No single creature is all-inclusive. None is or resembles another. 
To each belongs its own place and time, and in these its own manner, 
nature and existence" (349-350). 
It's true that it is by virtue of the fact that it's not God, on the one 
hand, and not identical with any of the non-existent possibles (to use the 
language of Barth's ontology), on the other hand, that the creature is 
menaced by its tendency toward not existing. But these negations by 
virtue of which it is menaced are not, as such, the Menace; and certainly 
these negations are not themselves evil. The presence of these negations 
does not represent the incursion of das Nichtige into creation. "When the 
creature crosses the frontier fof God's positive will and election] from 
the one side, and it is invaded from the other, nothingness achieves actu-
ality in the creaturely world. But in itself and as such this frontier is not 
nothingness" (350). One might rightly describe the negations belonging 
to the creature-flits distinction from God and its individual distinctive-
ness" -as belonging to the "shadow side" of creation. On this shadow 
side, the creature, says Barth, is "contiguous" to das Nichtige. Better, I 
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think, to say that it is contiguous to that which is not, and (ontologically) 
susceptible to the incursion of das Nichtige. But contiguity to that which is 
not, and susceptibility to the incursion of das Nichtige, is not yet the 
incursion of das Nichtige. 5 
All conceptions and doctrines which view nothingness as an essential 
and necessary determination of being and existence and therefore of the 
creature, or as an essential determination of the original and creative 
being of God Himself, are untenable from the Christian standpoint. 
They are untenable on two grounds, first, because they misrepresent the 
creature and even the Creator Himself, and second, because they con-
found the legitimate 'not' with nothingness, and are thus guilty of a 
drastic minimisation of the latter (350). 
Let us move on to the other, even more important, misconception 
against which Barth polemicizes. It is a near relative of the first. 
Pointing to "a negative aspect of creation and creaturely occurrence," 
the second misconception identifies this negative aspect with evil-that 
is, with das Nichtige qua evil. The similarity to the previous misconcep-
tion is obvious. What makes it different is that this "negative aspect" is 
distinct from the negations of the prior misconception. 
In creation there is, says Barth, 
not only a Yes but also a No; not only a height but also an abyss; 
not only clarity but also obscurity; not only growth but also 
decay; not only opulence but also indigence; not only beauty but 
also ashes; not only beginning but also end; not only value but 
also worthlessness .... [I]n creaturely existence ... there are hours, 
days and years both bright and dark, success and failure, laugh-
ter and tears, youth and age, gain and loss, birth and sooner or 
later its inevitable corollary, death (296-7). 
It is "irrefutable," however, "that creation and creature are good even in 
the fact that all that is exists in this contrast and antithesis. In all this, far 
from being null, it praises its Creator and Lord even on its shadowy side, 
even in the negative aspect in which it is so near to nothingness (296-7). 
There is a long tradition of philosophical writing about "the problem 
of evil" in which a good many, if not most, of Barth's examples of the 
negative aspect of creation are cited as evils: pain, suffering, loss, failure, 
infirmity. Barth dismisses this whole tradition as "an insult to 
Creator and creature" (301). Over and over in his discussion of creation 
and providence he makes the point that we are creatures of a definite sort 
with definite limitations;6 and that, in being creatures of our sort placed 
in a world of our sort, and as a consequence regularly undergoing nega-
tively 'valorized' experiences, we are to see God's gracious hand. 
It's part of our design plan, part of being a properly-functioning 
human being, that we should dislike pain, suffering, loss, failure, infir-
mity-that we should experience them negatively. And it's a well-nigh 
inevitable consequence of creatures with our design plan living in a 
world of this present sort that we would in fact experience pain, suffer-
ing, loss, failure, infirmity. It's well-nigh inevitable that experiences 
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which are in fact negatively valorized would come our way. About all 
this, there is, as such, nothing bad. These negative experiences are not, 
as such, evils. To creatures of our sort, living in a world of this present 
sort, experiencing these sorts of things, and experiencing them negative-
ly, God said Yes. 
Often it's possible to see a rationale to some negative aspect of our 
constitution or existence. In general, minus these negative aspects, 
human life would be precarious and flaccid. Precarious, if, upon break-
ing bones, we felt no pain, or didn't mind if we did; flaccid, if, upon fail-
ing in some endeavor, we felt no disappointment, or didn't mind if we 
did. It's true that in the negative aspect of our existence we are peculiar-
ly open to the incursions of das Nichtige. "Viewed from its negative 
aspect, creation is as it were on the frontier of nothingness and orientat-
ed towards it" (295-6). But the fact that this negative aspect of our exis-
tence places us on the frontier of das Nichtige, and makes us peculiarly 
open to its incursions, by no means implies that this negative aspect is to 
be identified with the actual incursions of das Nichtige. 
To confuse the negative aspect of human existence with evil is, for 
one thing, an insult to Creator and creature. "Since God's Word became 
flesh, He Himself has acknowledged that the distinct reality of the world 
created by Him is in both its forms, with its Yes and its No, that of the 
world which He willed ... .In the knowledge of Jesus Christ we must 
abandon the obvious prejudice against the negative aspect of creation 
and confess that God has planned and made all things well, even on the 
negative side. In the knowledge of Jesus Christ it is inadmissible to seek 
nothingness here" (301). 
"But in this confusion an error is also made in relation to nothingness 
itself. Being sought where he is not to be found, the enemy goes 
unrecognised .... Being understood as a side or aspect or distinctive form 
of creation, nothingness is brought into a positive relationship with 
God's will and work. Its nature and existence are attributed to God, to 
His will and responsibility, and the menacing and corruption of creation 
by das Nichtige are understood as His intention and act and therefore as 
a necessary and tolerable part of creaturely existence. We cannot really 
fear and loathe nothingness. We cannot consider and treat it as a real 
enemy" (301). 
§4. There is something right in the two misconceptions we have dis-
cussed. What is right is the underlying intuition that evil has to do with 
the negative-with negativity, with nullity, with not-ness, if we may 
speak thus. The intuition was of course present already in the patristics, 
and earlier yet, in the classical Greeks, finding expression in their sug-
gestion that evil is a lack of being, of a certain sort. The error in the mis-
conceptions we have discussed lies in the particular identification made. 
The challenge is to find that precise negativity, that precise nullity, that 
precise not-ness, which constitutes evil. 
Barth's proposal is that evil is that negating, nullifying dynamic or 
power "which opposes and resists God, which is itself subjected to and 
overcome by His opposition and resistance, and which in this twofold 
determination as the reality that negates and is negated by Him, is total-
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ly distinct from Him. The true nothingness is that which brought Jesus 
Christ to the cross, and that which He defeated there" (305). The funda-
mental point Barth wishes to make here is that the negativity which con-
stitutes evil in all its forms can be identified only if God is brought into 
the picture. Unless we bring God in, we'll miss its nature. There is at 
work in reality a power, a dynamic, toward the negating of God's pur-
poses and desires, which in turn God negates. Evil is that. Evil is not 
just a factor-the factor, say, of things going amiss with respect to God's 
purposes and desires. Evil is the dynamic toward the frustrating of those 
purposes and desires. The dynamic toward the negating of those purpos-
es and desires. A power of negating God's will which in turn God 
negates. 50 as to distinguish it from all those forms of negativity of 
which we have already taken note-from non-being, from that which is 
not, from negations, from the negative aspects of creaturely life-Barth 
chooses to call it nothingness, das Nichtige. The choice is not arbitrary; he 
thinks that this is what Heidegger and 5artre had their eye on when they 
spoke of nothingness. 
An obvious question is whether it's right to identify this dynamic 
toward the active negating of God's purposes and desires, with that 
ontological menace of which we spoke earlier, and which Barth also 
called das Nichtige. Isn't Barth using "das Nichtige" equivocally? 
There is indeed a difference which must not be overlooked. The men-
acing tendency of creation to sink back into non-existence is averted by 
God. Were God not to avert that menace, the evil of all evils would take 
place, viz., the disappearance of creation, thus negating God's purposes 
and desires in the most fundamental way possible. In fact, however, onto-
logical menace does not become ontological catastrophe. God's negating 
of the negating power which is ontological menace takes the form of pre-
venting that power from being actualized. The creation still exists. God 
providentially preserves it. By contrast, the menace which is das Nichtige 
in its other form is not averted. Evil occurs. In this case, God's negating 
of the negating power takes the form of opposing its incursions. 
Yet, there remains something of importance common to ontological 
menace, on the one hand, and to that negating of God's purposes and 
desires which is evil, on the other hand: both are dynamics, powers, pre-
sent in the created order, which menace God's will. It is that shared 
character of menacing dynamic that requires us to see these two phenome-
na together, and entitles us to call them both das Nichtige. In one of das 
Nichtige's two major forms, the menacing dynamic is averted before 
being actualized; in the other, the menacing dynamic is actualized 
before being defeated. 
What sort of reality are we to ascribe to das Nichtige, Barth asks. We 
can't say that it's "nothing, i.e., that it does not exist. God takes it into 
account. He is concerned with it. He strives against it, resists and over-
comes it.. .. If we accept this, we cannot argue that...nothingness is noth-
ing, i.e., it does not exist. That which confronts God in this way, and is 
seriously treated by Him, is surely not nothing or non-existent.. .. All 
conceptions or doctrine which would deny or diminish or minimise 
this ... are untenable from the Christian standpoint. Nothingness is not 
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nothing" (349). And obviously it's not God. Is it then a creature? 
Perhaps an angel which has freely chosen to oppose God, as much of the 
Christian tradition would have said? 
Barth's rejection of this suggestion is brief-brief for him, that is (522-
531)! Several points of response come to mind. For one thing, it makes 
no sense to identify das Nichtige, in its persona of ontological menace, 
with some fallen creature; the menacing tendency to sink back into not 
existing is of the wrong ontological category to be identified with a crea-
ture. And if it were a creature, why wouldn't God just let it do what it 
tends to do; viz., sink back into non-existence? Furthermore, as we shall 
see in a bit more detail shortly, Barth's understanding of freely chosen 
evil action-sin-is that though it is the agent's own act, for which the 
agent is responsible, nonetheless it is also "surrender to the alien power 
of an adversary" (310). If then we identify that alien power with some 
spiritual creature, we shall have to say that the sinful choices of that 
adversarial creature are themselves not made under the influence of any 
alien power whatsoever. These, I say, are points of response that come to 
mind. Barth's actual response is different from any of them. In the bibli-
cal view, "God sees and therefore treats all things, including nothingness, 
with justice, i.e., according to their true being" (524). God's attitude 
toward das Nichtige is total condemnation; for das Nichtige "is falsehood in 
its very being" (525). Justice for das Nichtige consists of total annihilation. 
That cannot be said of any creature-not even of a rebellious angel. 
Barth does not deny the existence of demons and demonic powers. 
What he argues instead is that those are to be identified with das Nichtige 
in its persona as evil. The language of "demons" and "demonic powers" 
is another way of speaking of das Nichtige. 
Everything which has to be said about [nothingnessl is also to be 
said of demons as the opponents of God's heavenly ambassadors 
[i.e., the angels]. They are. As we cannot deny the peculiar exis-
tence of nothingness, we cannot deny their existence. They are 
null and void, but they are not nothing .... Their being is neither 
that of God nor that of the creature, neither that of heavenly crea-
tures nor that of earthly, for they are neither the one nor the 
other. They are not divine but non-divine and anti-divine. On 
the other hand, God has not created them, and therefore they are 
not creaturely .... This is all to be said of demons as of nothing-
ness. They are not different from the latter. They do not stand 
apart. They derive from it. They themselves are always nothing-
ness. They are nothingness in its dynamic, to the extent that it 
has form and power and movement and activity. This is how 
Holy Scripture understands this alien element" (523). 
Demons are "the exponents" of das Nichtige, "the powers of falsehood in 
a thousand different forms" (527). 
So what then is the ontological location of das Nichtige? What is its 
ontological category? If, on the one hand, it's not simply nothing; but if, 
on the other hand, it's neither God nor any of the powers and activities 
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of God, nor any creature nor any of the powers and activities of any 
creature, what is it? It's a power; Yes. But it's not a power of either God 
or creature. There seems to be nothing of which it is a power-a free-
floating power. We must conclude, says Barth, that it exists "in a third 
way of its own" (349). Which is, of course, not to say anything more 
than that it is neither God nor creature. In addition to God and creatures, 
to their powers and activities, there is das Nichtige. 7 
Though we do not know how to locate das Nichtige ontologically, we 
do know its nature, its identity, says Barth. The identity of das Nichtige is 
determined by its relation to God's purposes and desires. Specifically, 
the identity of das Nichtige consists in its being that power and dynamic 
which negates God's will and which, in turn, God negates. God's will is 
thus, in an odd way, the condition of there being das Nichtige and the 
basis of its identity. Only because God said Yes to certain possibilities, 
and therein No to others, can there be any such thing as opposition to 
God's will. God "says Yes, and therefore says No to that to which He 
has not said Yes. He works according to his purpose, and in so doing 
rejects and dismisses all that gainsays it.... It is only on this basis that 
nothingness 'is,' but on this basis it really 'is.' As God is Lord on the left 
hand as well, He is the basis and Lord of nothing too" (351). 
So far, so good. But Barth succumbs to the temptation to say that 
God's negative will is not only the necessary condition of anything hav-
ing the identity of being the dynamic of negating God's will which God 
in turn negates, but that it is the sufficient conuition for the existence of 
that dynamic. The passage quoted just above continues, "That which 
God renounces and abandons in virtue of His decision is not merely 
nothing. It is nothingness, and has as such its own being .... Nothingness 
is that which God does not will. It lives only by the fact that it is that 
which God does not will. But it does live by this fact. For not only what 
God wills, but what He does not will, is potent, and must have a real 
correspondence. What really corresponds to that which God does not 
will is nothingness" (352). The passage is less than decisively clear on 
the issue at hand. Barth's thinking appears to be that if Cod said No, 
then there's something to which Cod said No. But since that was not 
some previously existing creature, nor some entity whose existence was 
entirely independent of God, it must be the case that that to which God 
said No exists on account of God saying No to it. That, I say, appears to 
be Barth's reasoning in the passage; but it's not entirely clear. I take the 
following passage to confirm that that was in fact how he was thinking: 
The demons [i.e., das Nichtigel "are only as Cod affirms Himself and the 
creature and thus pronounces a necessary No. They exist in virtue of the 
fact [my emphasisl that His turning to involves a turning from, His elec-
tion a rejection .... They are as they are judged, repudiated and excluded 
by God" (523). 
It turns out, then, that Barth's thinking here is wholly parallel to his 
thinking about das Nichtige in its persona of ontological menace. In cre-
ation, God's Yes implies a No. And his Yes, amounts to his saying Yes to 
something; those are the creatures. Likewise, his saying No, amounts to 
his saying No to something; those are the uncreated possibles. God's say-
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ing Yes to the creatures is what brings them into existence; and God's 
saying No to the unactualized possibles is what brings them into exis-
tence. So too, within creation, God's saying No to all that threatens the 
well-being of the creature brings about the power of threatening the 
creature. For if God says No to threats to the creature, then there is some-
thing to which God says No. And God's saying No to those threats is 
what brings them into existence. The reasoning is as flawed in this latter 
case as we saw it to be in the other. 
It turns out, then, that in spite of his claim that evil is "incomprehensi-
ble and inexplicable," there is much about evil that Barth professes to 
comprehend and explain-more than he should. We know the nature, 
the essence, of evil. Likewise, we know why there is something which 
has this essence. And in a certain way we even know, as we shall see 
shortly, why the menace to the creature is not averted in the case of evil, 
whereas, by contrast, it is averted in the case of ontological menace. 
What we do not know is the ontology of evil-other than that it is a 
power; we don't understand what sort of being it is that is neither 
Creator nor creature, yet brought about by the Creator. 
Though it's been implicit in what's been said, there's one point worth 
highlighting before we leave this part of our topic. That which consti-
tutes the essence of das Nichtige is the very same thing that gives to it its 
character of evil. For what is fundamentally definitive of evil, from the 
Christian standpoint, is resistance to grace; and such resistance, as we 
have seen, is the essence of das Nichtige. 
What God positively wills and performs in the opus proprium of 
His election, of His creation, of His preservation and overruling 
rule of the creature .. .is His grace .... What God does not will and 
therefore negates and rejects, what can thus be only the object of 
His opus alienum, of his jealousy, wrath and judgment, is a being 
that refuses and resists and therefore lacks His grace. This being 
which is alien and adverse to grace and therefore without it, is 
that of das Nichtige .... and this is evil in the Christian sense, name-
ly, what is alien and adverse to grace, and therefore without it. 
For it is God's honour and right to be gracious, and this is what 
das Nichtige contests. It is also the salvation and right of the 
creature to receive and live by the grace of God, and this is what 
it disturbs and obstructs (353). 
§5. One of the forms assumed by das Nichtige's incursions into the cre-
ated order is sin. The point of saying this is that though sin is "man's own 
act, achievement, and guilt" (310), it's more than that. It's something 
"under which we suffer" in a way which is "sometimes palpable but 
sometimes we can only sense and sometimes is closely hidden. In Holy 
Scripture, while man's full responsibility for its commission is main-
tained, even sin itself is described as his surrender to the alien power of 
an adversary .... He is led astray and harms himself, or rather lets himself 
be harmed. He is not merely a thief but one who has himself fallen 
among thieves" (310).8 From this we can infer that Barth would dismiss 
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as woefully inadequate any attempt to account for evil by locating it in 
free will wrongly used, coupled with the overriding value God attaches, 
in creation and providence, to free will however used, rightly or wrong-
ly. The sinful exercise of free will is to be understood as not only an 
action of the agent, but as also, submission to the power of das Nichtige. 
Barth insists, emphatically, that sin is not the only concrete form of das 
Nichtige in its persona of evil. Das Nichtige also manifests itself in all that 
exhibits and tends toward what he regularly calls "evil and death," 
meaning by "evil" not "the ills which are inseparably bound up with 
creaturely existence in virtue of the negative aspect of creation," but "evil 
as something wholly anomalous which threatens and imperils this exis-
tence"; and meaning by "death" not "dying as the natural termination of 
life," but death as the total opposite of human flourishing, namely, "the 
ultimate irruption and triumph of that alien power which annihilates 
creaturely existence and thus discredits and disclaims the Creator" 
(310).9 Das Nichtige aims at "the comprehensive negation of the creature 
and its nature" (310). And it is "absolutely essential" that it be seen in its 
form of 'evil and death,' as well as in its form of sin, "if we are to under-
stand what is at issue and to what we refer ... .In the incarnation God 
exposed Himself to nothingness .. .in order to repel and defeat it. He did 
so in order to destroy the destroyer. The Gospel records of the miracles 
and acts of Jesus are not just formal proofs of His Messiahship, ... but as 
such, they are objective manifestations of His character as the Conqueror 
not only of sin but also of evil and death, as the Destroyer of the destroy-
er, as the Saviour in the most inclusive sense" (311).10 
§6. I think there can be no doubt that in his account of evil-at least in 
that part of it which we have seen thus far-Barth satisfies the require-
ment he set for himself of honoring the holiness of God. To das Nichtige 
in general, and to das Nichtige in its persona of evil, in particular-that is, 
to das Nichtige as manifested in sins, evils, and eternal death-God unre-
lentingly and unwaveringly says No. The essence of evil is that it is that 
to which God says No; and there really are things to which God says 
No, namely, sins, evils and eternal death. Barth wants nothing to do 
with any of that multitude of theories which say that those phenomena 
which he, Barth, identifies as sins and evils, are not really evil but mere-
ly "negative aspects" of human existence-like the dissonances in a Bach 
fugue which, if heard all by themselves, are repulsive, but which, when 
heard within the context of the whole, are seen to contribute indispens-
ably to the goodness of the whole. It's not the case that reality is good 
through and through. There is evil in it: that which is in opposition to 
God and to which God is therefore in opposition. God does not survey 
the whole with blissful satisfaction, finding nothing to which he wishes 
to say No. God is angry, wrathful. Barth's metaphors for God are the 
metaphors of one engaged in combat, not the metaphors of one engaged 
in blissful contemplation. Battlefield, not art museum. Rather than 
being" a majestic, passive and beatific God on high," God is "the 
Adversary of this adversary" (357). 
But what about the other requirement, of honoring the omnipotence of 
God? If things aren't going as God wants, if reality is laced through with 
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that to which God says No, isn't God radically lacking in power? Not at 
all, says Barth. The issue is not whether God is omnipotent, but of the 
form which omnipotence takes. God's omnipotence is not that of one 
who finds nothing to which to say No, no menace and no incursion; it's 
that of one who wins the battle against that to which he says No. Das 
Nichtige "has no perpetuity. God not only has perpetuity, but is Himself 
the basis, essence and sum of all being. And for all its finiteness and 
mutability even His creature has perpetuity-the perpetuity which he 
wills to grant it in fellowship with Himself, and which cannot be lacking 
in this fellowship but is given it to all eternity. Nothingness, however, is 
not created by God, nor is there any covenant with it. Hence it has no per-
petuity" (360). It is 'broken, judged, refuted and destroyed at the central 
point, in the mighty act of salvation accomplished in Jesus Christ" (367). 
In this is to be seen the "incredible and real mystery of the free grace 
of God," "that He makes His own the cause of the creature" (356). There 
was no necessity in this, Barth insists. God might have been content 
with the fact that in creating and preserving he overcomes the ontologi-
cal menace of das Nichtigc, "separated, negated, rejected and aban-
doned" it (356). He might have declared that such inroads as das 
Nichtige makes within creation are the business of the creature. His own 
battle, against the tendency of creation to slide back into non-existence, 
is won; let the creature now take over. He might have remained "aloof 
and detached," "a majestic, passive and beatific God on high" (357). In 
fact he did not. He did not because, 
having created the creature, He has pledged His faithfulness to 
it .... That is to say, He whom nothingness has no power to 
offend is prepared on behalf of His creature to be primarily and 
properly offended and humiliated, attacked and injured by 
nothingness .... Though Adam is fallen and disgraced, he is not 
too low for God to make Himself his Brother, and to be for him 
a God who must strangely contend for his status, honour and 
right. For the sake of this Adam God becomes poor .... He lets a 
catastrophe which might be quite remote from Him approach 
Him and affect His very heart.... He does this of His free grace. 
For He is under no compulsion. He might act as the erroneous 
view postulates .... [B]ut He descends to the depths, and con-
cerns Himself with nothingness, because in his goodness he 
does not will to cease to be concerned for his creature .... He 
would rather be unblest with His creature than be the blessed 
God of an unblest creature .... He actually becomes a creature, 
and thus makes the cause of the creature His own in the most 
concrete reality and not just in appearance, really taking its 
place (356-358). 
Barth adds that "there are few heresies so pernicious as that of a God 
who faces nothingness more or less unaffected and unconcerned, and 
the parallel doctrine of man as one who must engage in independent 
conflict against it" (360). 
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Barth concedes that the defeat of das Nichtige achieved in "the mighty 
act of salvation accomplished in Jesus Christ...is not yet visible or recog-
nisable" (367). The "final revelation of its destruction has not yet taken 
place and all creation must still await and expect it" (367). In faith we 
know, says Barth, that it "is now objectively defeated as such in Jesus 
Christ." "It cannot be doubted" (367). But it's not evident. The "blind-
ness of our eyes and the cover which is still over us [obscures] the 
prospect of the kingdom of God already established as the only king-
dom undisputed by evil" (8). 
The words suggest that now, after the death and resurrection of Jesus, 
it only appears that there's evil; there isn't really. But that can't be Barth's 
meaning; for there's nothing more fundamental to his account of evil 
than his insistence that there really is evil in the world. What he has to 
mean is the following: once upon a time there was reason to think that 
the dominion of the powers of darkness was perhaps equal, or even 
superior, to that of God. However, in the death and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ, God has defeated the powers; accordingly, therein it is 
manifest that their dominion is not, and was not, equal to God's. All 
along it was only a "semblance of validity" (367), that is, a semblance of 
dominion equal or superior to God's. Nonetheless, though the powers 
of darkness were defeated in Jesus Christ, and their dominion therein 
displayed as inferior, the incursion of those powers is not yet over. So 
much is this the case, that to our ordinary secular eyes there's about as 
much reason as ever to wonder whether perhaps the powers of darkness 
are not equal or even superior to those of God. It's not evident that das 
Nichtige lost the battle. That, so I suggest, is what Barth has in mind. 
There's an obvious question: Why, if das Nichtige lost the battle, do its 
incursions continue? If das Nichtige has been defeated, then it "can have 
even its semblance of validity only under the decree of God. What it 
now is and does, it can be and do only in the hand of God" (367). So 
why do its incursions continue? 
Barth's answer is that "there is a legitimate place here for a favourite 
concept of the older dogmatics-that of permission. God still permits 
His kingdom not to be seen by us, and to that extent He still permits us 
to be a prey to nothingness" (367). And indeed, what else could Barth 
say at this point? But is permission of evil compatible with the holiness 
of God? Hasn't Barth, at the end of the day, failed to satisfy one of the 
conditions he set for himself, that in his account of evil he fully honor 
the holiness of God? Can a holy God permit evil? 
The answer is surely that introducing permission of this sort at this 
point does not, so far forth, compromise the holiness of God. Sins and 
evils remain evil; they are not reconceived as "negative aspects." The 
reason is that, in general, one may permit something to happen that one 
could prevent while nonetheless disapproving of it, desiring that it not 
happen. One's reason for permitting it might be of many different sorts; 
but if it's to be a morally acceptable reason, it will have to be of the form 
that one (non-culpably) believed that preventing the evil would not 
secure a greater good, overall, than permitting it. Which implies that 
one's permission occurs within the context of being in control of the situ-
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ation. Clearly it's along these lines that Barth is thinking. God "thinks it 
good that we should exist 'as if' He had not yet mastered [das Nichtige]" 
(367). The truth is that the incursions of das Nichti~ are now, strangely, 
"an instrument of [God's] will and action" (367). 1 Even though das 
Nichtige "does not will to do so it is forced to serve [God], to serve His 
Word and work, the honour of His Son, the proclamation of the Gospel, 
the faith of the community, and therefore the way which He Himself 
wills to go within and with His creation until its day is done. The 
defeated, captured and mastered enemy of God has as such become His 
servant. Good care is taken that he should always show himself a 
strange servant.. .. Yet it is even more important to reflect that good care 
is taken by this One that even nothingness should be one of the things of 
which it is said that they must work together for good to them that love 
Him"(367-8). Barth makes no attempt to describe the general pattern of 
sins and evils working together for good; perhaps he thinks there is no 
general pattern. 
Even as subject in this strange way to God's providence, however, das 
Nichtige "has no perpetuity .... As God fulfils his true and positive work, 
His negative work becomes pointless and redundant and can be termi-
nated and ended." Barth adds that "it is of major importance at this 
point that we should not become involved in the logical dialectic that if 
God loves, elects and affirms eternally He must also hate and therefore 
reject and negate eternally. There is nothing to make God's activity on 
the left hand as necessary and perpetual as His activity on the right.... 
This negative activity of God has as such, in accordance with its mean-
ing and nature, a definite frontier, and this is to be found at the point 
where it attains its goal and accomplishes its purpose. With the attain-
ment of the goal the opus alienum of God also reaches its end" (360-361). 
What does Barth mean? Does he mean that when the battle is over, 
das Nichtige itself will have disappeared, so that there is no longer any 
menace to the creature, neither ontological nor existential? Or does he 
mean that though the menace of both sorts will remain, the menace will 
be no more than menace? No longer will there be an incursion of das 
Nichtige into the life of the creature. No longer will there be evil-sins, 
evils, and death? Does he mean that just as ontological menace has 
always been stymied, existential menace will be stymied as well? 
Barth's language certainly suggests the former interpretation. He 
doesn't say that evil has no perpetuity; he says that das Nichtige has no 
perpetuity. But if that's what he wants to say, doesn't his earlier line of 
reasoning, which I criticized, now come back to haunt him-I mean, his 
reasoning that God's Yes inevitably involves a No as well, and that, if 
God says No, then thereby and thereupon there is that to which God 
said No, this being the power of das Nichtige. For presumably God's 
opus proprium, God's Yes-saying, continues; hence, by the above reason-
ing, das Nichtige also continues. Or does God's opus proprium not contin-
ue? Does God's work cease? Does God rest? 
The clue to how Barth was thinking is to be found in a few para-
graphs which occur in the passage on The Divine Preserving, in section 
§49, where Barth discusses the eternal preservation of the creature. 
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Temporal creation is destined to be incorporated into the eternal life of 
God; when thus incorporated, all menace will have disappeared. The 
Yes which is God's creation and preservation will have ceased; likewise 
the Yes which is God's providential affirmation of the temporal well-
being of the creature will have ceased. God will be at rest; and the crea-
ture at rest within God. 
The time will come, says Barth, "when the created world as a whole 
will only have been. In the final act of salvation history, i.e., in the reve-
lation of Jesus Christ as the Foundation and Deliverer and head of the 
whole of creation, the history of creation will also reach its goal and end. 
It need not progress any further, it will have fulfilled its purpose .... It 
will not need any continuance of temporal existence" (87-88). This does 
not mean the end of God's preservation, however. God's preservation 
will continue-only now as eternal preservation, not temporal. "Eternal 
preservation does not mean a continuation of the [temporal] existence of 
the creature. To what end and for what purpose could it continue to be 
when already it has had and fulfilled its course ... " (88)? 
liThe eternal preservation of the creature of God means negatively 
that its destruction is excluded" (89). Were its destruction to be permit-
ted, that "would mean that the non-existent had triumphed over the 
creature of God, that by giving such power to the non-existent God had 
finally revoked His own work, and that He had finally retracted that Yes 
and given Himself to isolation" (89). However, "by means of that which 
He did on behalf of the creature when He Himself became creature, He 
has in fact broken the power of the non-existent against the creature 
when He Himself became creature, destroying it and removing the 
threat of it" (89). 
liThe eternal preservation of the creature means positively ... that it can 
continue eternally before Him. God is the One who was, and is, and is 
to come. With Him the past is future, and both past and future are pre-
sent.... And one day-to speak in temporal terms-when the totality of 
everything that was and is and will be will only have been, then in the 
totality of its temporal duration it will still be open and present to Him, 
and therefore preserved: eternally preserved .... Everything will be pre-
sent to Him exactly as it was or is or will be, in all its reality, in the 
whole temporal course of its activity, in its strength or weakness, in its 
majesty or meanness. He will not allow anything to perish, but will 
hold it in the hollow of His hand as He has always done, and does and 
will. He will allow it to partake of His own eternal life. And in this way 
the creature will continue to be, in its limitation, even in its limited tem-
poral duration .... In all the unrest of its being in time it will be enfolded 
by the rest of God, and in Him it will itself be at rest, just as even now in 
all its unrest it is hidden and can be at rest in the rest of God. This is the 
eternal preservation of God" (89-90). 
§7. Karl Barth's discussion of evil is extraordinarily rich, insightful, 
imaginative, and provocative-filled with observations and emphases 
that the Christian philosopher ought to take seriously. I think, to cite 
just a few examples, of his observations concerning what I have called 
"ontological menace," of his insistence that the "negative aspects" of our 
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existence are not to be regarded as evil, of his insistence that sin, while 
certainly the act of the person who sins, is also submission to an alien 
power, of his insistence that the nature of evil is determined by its nega-
tive relation to God's desires and purposes, of his insistence that God 
does not survey creation with unalloyed bliss but is engaged in combat 
as one who is wounded and wrathful, of his insistence that God's 
omnipotence is to be located in God's winning the battle against menace 
and evil rather than in everything happening as God wishes, and, most 
fundamentally, of his insistence that evil is a power-a nullifying, negat-
ing, nihilating power. These particular points all seem to me true as 
well as important. 
Along the way in my presentation of Barth's thought I have made 
some critical comments; just now I have expressed agreement on several 
fundamental points. This is the merest beginning of the critical engage-
ment which Barth's thought merits. On this occasion it is impossible to 
do more, however. In closing, let me merely call attention to the funda-
mental structure of Barth's account of evil, and contrast his account with 
some of the major options present in the philosophical tradition. 
I judge that the most fundamental points at which Barth's account 
differs from most of the philosophical accounts of evil is in the insistence 
that evil is a power, in the insistence that the negative aspects of our con-
stitution and situation are not evil, in the insistence that evil can accord-
ingly not be identified by reference to such negative aspects, and in the 
insistence that God is wounded and angered by much of what transpires 
in creation. On that last point, Barth differs not only from most of the 
philosophical tradition, but from much if not most of the theological tra-
dition as well; perhaps that is also true for the second and third points. 
Barth himself discusses (316-334), in some detail, his disagreements on 
these points with the "great" and "mighty" Leibniz, and in great detail 
his disagreements with Schleiermacher (while also vigorously defending 
Schleiermacher against a number of misguided objections). 
The traditional account to which Barth's account comes closest is the 
free-will account-that is, the account which says that evil is due to the 
free agency of human and angelic/demonic persons. Barth, of course, 
rejects this account. He holds that human sin must be understood, in 
part, as submission to an alien, God-defying, power; and he holds that 
that power cannot be identified with any creature whatsoever. 
Nonetheless, both accounts hold that God is genuinely displeased by 
what transpires in the world; there's genuine evil. Furthermore, it's open 
to those who embrace the free-will account to join with Barth in saying 
that God is wounded and angered by what transpires in creation. The free-
will account joins Barth's in resisting the temptation to eliminate genuine 
evil by treating sins and evils as negative aspects of our nature and situa-
tion, all of these sins and evils together making an indispensable contri-
bution to the greater good, thus grounding God's unalloyed bliss. 
Barth's strategy for resisting the lure of the negative-aspects account 
can be seen as consisting of three moves. The first of these is his claim 
that creation without ontological menace is impossible, coupled with his 
claim that God's desire for fellowship with the creature and for the crea-
BARTH ON EVIL 605 
ture's flourishing unavoidably brings about existential menace; only the 
eventual incorporation of creation into the eternal life of God can 
remove these menaces. Second, Barth assumes, without ever, so far as I 
have noticed, making a point of the matter, that the existential menace is 
of such a character that God's only option for dealing with it was to 
overcome it after it was actualized, rather than to stymie it, as with the 
existential menace. And third, God for God's own good reasons now 
permits the existential menace to continue its incursions, these good rea-
sons consisting, at least in part, of the fact that evil itself is now forced to 
contribute to the good of the creature. 
In the free-will account there is nothing like the first two of these 
moves. At the point of the third move, however, there is close resem-
blance. The free-will account is fundamentally a trade-off account. God 
decided to trade off the situation of no evil coupled with no free agents, 
for the greater overall good of free agency, human and cosmic, coupled 
with the evil of their sins and ensuing evils. If, for each situation in 
which a given agent might find itself, there is a fact of the matter as to 
what that agent would freely choose in that situation, and if God 
foreknew all these facts, then God knew in advance the details of the 
trade-off he was making at creation. If there are no such facts, or if there 
are but God did not know them at creation, then at creation God would 
have held in reserve the option of calling the whole thing off should the 
point be reached where the trade-off was no longer acceptable. 
Barth's third move, like the free-will account as a whole, consists of 
viewing God as making a trade-off. Having defeated das Nichtige at the 
cross, God could have called to a halt its ingressions. But God did not, for 
reasons which in their totality are known to God alone; God permits das 
Nichtige to continue to work evil. The details of the trade-off are signifi-
cantly different from that of the free-will account. In the Barthian account 
it is das Nichtige which God permits to continue to work evil-das Nichtige 
being the uncreated power which, against but mysteriously on account of 
God's will, ineluctably accompanies creation and providence; in the free-
will account, it is creatures possessing the power of free agency who are 
permitted to continue to work evil. Furthermore, on the Barthian account, 
the goods which ensue from permitting the power of evil to continue to 
work its evil ways are presumably diverse-as already noted, Barth makes 
no attempt to generalize; on the free-will account, the good in view is just 
one, viz., the great good of free agency. So the differences are significant. 
Nonetheless, the final move in Barth's three-part strategy is also a trade-off 
move: God trades the good of stopping das Nichtige in its tracks for the 
greater overall good which ensues from permitting it to continue its incur-
sions for a while. It's hard to see how an account which both honors God's 
omnipotence and, by acknowledging that there genuinely is evil in the 
world, not just "negative aspects," honors God's holiness, could be any-
thing other than, in part at least, a trade-off account. 
"The light shines in the darkness; and the darkness has not overcome it" 
John 1:5 
Yale University 
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NOTES 
1. Cf 527-8: "We cannot deny the power and powers of falsehood in a 
thousand different forms. We cannot deny that in their infamous way they 
are real and brisk and vital, often serious and solemn, but always sly and 
strong, and always present in different combinations of these qualities, 
forming a dreadful fifth or sixth dimension of existence. Where? But surely 
the real question is: Where not? They are there in the depths of the soul 
which we regard as most properly our own. They are there in the relation-
ships between man and man, and especially between man and woman. 
They are there in the developments of individuals and their mutual relation-
ships. They are there in the concern and struggle for daily bread, and espe-
cially for that which each thinks is also necessary in his case. They are there 
in that in which man seeks his satisfaction or which he would rather avoid 
as undesirable, in his care and carelessness, in the flaming up and extin-
guishing of his passions, in his sloth and zeal, in his inexplicable stupidity 
and astonishing cleverness, in his systematisation and anarchism, in his 
progress, equilibrium and retrogression, in the great common ventures of 
what is called culture, science, art, technics and politics, in the conflict and 
concord of classes, peoples, and nations, in the savage dissensions but also 
the beautiful agreement and tolerances in the life of the Church, and not 
least in the rabies and even more so the inertia theologorum .... We cannot 
deny but must soberly recognise that in all these things the demons are con-
stantly present and active like the tentacles of an octopus ... .They are powers 
indeed, and yet they are only the powers of falsehood." 
2. "The creative work of God has this in common with His work of 
grace-that ... these things take place within the created order with the very 
same immediacy as the act of creation itself .... But when it is a matter of the 
preservation of creation as such, when it is a matter of that which succeeds 
creation but precedes redemption, there is need of a free but obviously not of 
a direct or immediate activity on the part of God" (64). 
3. I judge this interpretation of what Barth was "really" getting at to be 
confirmed by the following passage, in which Barth, more than 200 pages 
later than the passages we have been scrutinizing, summarizes his earlier dis-
cussion: " ... we were trying to understand the divine preservation of the crea-
ture. We saw this to be God's preservation of His creature from being over-
thrown by the greater force of nothingness. We then considered how God 
confirms and upholds the separation between His creature and nothingness 
as effected in creation, halting the threatened and commencing enslavement 
of the creature." Barth immediately goes on to add the third point which I 
(am about to) make in the text above: "We saw that he does this because His 
will for His creature is liberation for a life in fellowship with Himself, 
because He wills to be known and praised by the creature as its Liberator 
and because He thus wills its continuation and not its destruction" (290). 
4. I allow myself a bit of poetic (philosophical?) license here. After a 
statement of the problem, Barth does begin his discussion of das Nichtige 
with a section entitled "The Misconception of Nothingness." But what he 
discusses in that section is only the misconception which is the second of the 
two sorts in my arrangement. He discusses the misconception which is the 
first, in my arrangement, when he gets around later to what he calls "a com-
prehensive statement" (349). 
5. Even prior to creation, there will be an infinitude of things that God 
is not. On the trinitarian understanding of God, there will even be negations 
within God. These are additional reasons, not mentioned by Barth, for not 
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identifying negations with das Nichtige qua evil-nor even with das Nichtige 
as such. In those negations, there is no menace. 
6. "That the creature may continue to be in virtue of the divine preser-
vation does not mean that either as an individual or in its totality it is a crea-
ture without any limits. It may continue to be as a creature within its limits. 
It may have its place in space, and its span in time. It, may begin at one 
point and end at another. It may come, and stay, and go. It may compre-
hend the earth but not heaven. It may be free here, but bound there; open at 
this point, but closed at that. It may understand one thing, but not another; 
be capable of one thing, but not another; accomplish one thing but not 
another. That it may be in this way, within its limits, is not at all an imper-
fection, an evil necessity, an obscure fate. Were we in a position to compare 
and comprehend all the possibilities of all creatures, and the possibilities of 
the individual with those of the totality, we should be astonished at the 
magnificent breadth of these limits. And certainly it is not a curse but a 
blessing that there are these limits to humanity and creation, and that in 
some cases they are notoriously narrow limits, of which the brevity of 
human life is only a single if rather drastic example. The creature must not 
exist like the unhappy centre of a circle which has no periphery. It must 
exist in a genuine circle, its individual environment....It has freedom to expe-
rience and accomplish that which is proper to it, to do that which it can do, 
and to be satisfied. It is in this freedom that it is preserved by God" (85). 
7. In pp. 524-7, Barth strongly suggests that our wish, as theoreticians, 
to locate das Nichtige ontologically, thus to assign to it its proper place in an 
ontological system, represents a victory for das Nichtige. Instead of opposing 
it with tooth and fang as that which does not fit into God's creation, as what 
which menaces creation, we try to show how it does fit in. "Let us only inte-
grate the devil and the kingdom of demons and evil into the same system in 
which elsewhere and according to their different character we also treat of 
God and Christ and true man and the angels! Let us only do this kingdom 
the honour of taking it seriously in this senseL .. Nothing could suit it better 
than to find a sure place in the philosophical outlook of man or the world of 
human thought, securing recognition as a serious co-worker and opponent 
of God and man" (526). I find this unconvincing! 
8. Cf. 307-308: "The reality of nothingness is not seen sharply enough, 
even in its concrete form as sin, if sin is understood only generally as aberra-
tion from God and disobedience to His will. This is true enough, but we 
cannot stop at this generalisation. Otherwise we might escape and extricate 
ourselves with the assertion that we are men, creatures, and not God, and 
that therefore our aberration from God, and to that extent our disobedience, 
and therefore sin and nothingness, are basically no more than our essential 
and natural imperfection in contrast with His perfection ... .In sin as the con-
crete form of nothingness we should then be dealing again with merely the 
negative aspect of creation." Sin is not only the creature's act of disobedi-
ence, but the creature's submission to das Nichtige-hence, the concrete form 
of das Nichtige's opposition to God. 
9. Cf. p. 74: "not death as a natural limitation but eternal death, the 
enemy and annihilator of life." And p. 312: "The New Testament says that 
[Christ] suffered death for the forgiveness of the sins of many, but it also 
says, and the two statements must not be dissociated, that He did so in 
order to take away the power of death, real death, death as the condemna-
tion and destruction of the creature, death as the offender against God and 
the last enemy." 
10. Barth adds that "It is a serious matter that all the Western as opposed 
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to Eastern Church has invariably succeeded in minimising and devaluating, 
and still does so today, this New Testament emphasis. And Protestantism 
especially has always been far too moralistic and spiritualistic. .. " (311). 
l1.This is the strangeness which Barth had in mind when, in a passage 
quoted earlier, from the beginning of the section on God and Nothingness, 
he said that "there is amongst the objects of God's providence an alien fac-
tor. It cannot escape God's providence but is comprehended by it. The 
manner, however, in which this is done is highly peculiar in accordance 
with the particular nature of this factor" (289). 
